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Motivation’s Pick-Me-Upper: Enhancing
Performance Through Motivation-
Enhancing Drugs
Keisha Shantel Ray, University of South Carolina
In “Enhancing Motivation by Use of Prescription Stimu-
lants: The Ethics of Motivation Enhancement,” Torben
Kjærsgaard (2015) argues that the term “cognitive
enhancement substances”—prescription drugs, typically
stimulants, that are taken by healthy individuals to
enhance performance—is problematic because the drugs
do not enhance cognitive functions, such as memory and
information processing. Rather, so-called cognitive
enhancing substances work by minimizing fatigue and
enhancing motivation. Therefore, the effects of these drugs
are best described as performance maintenance and not
performance enhancement. Drawing this conclusion about
cognitive enhancing substances1 means that the typical
ways that we discuss the ethical implications of stimulant
use by healthy individuals are misguided. However, mak-
ing this shift in terminology appropriately redirects our
ethical discussion to stimulants’ effects on healthy individ-
uals’ motivation. Additionally, more attention to motiva-
tion enhancement is warranted because sometimes
motivation enhancement is unethical.
In this commentary I challenge Kjærsgaard’s argument
on a technical point, a point with implications for how we
discuss the ethics of cognitive enhancing substances. I
challenge his conclusion that the motivating effects of cog-
nitive enhancing substances are not best characterized as
performance enhancement. I challenge his conclusion on
the grounds that both life’s ordinary, daily activities and
life’s extraordinary activities are types of performances
necessary for living the kinds of lives that we want to live,
which can be enhanced, not just maintained, with the
effects of cognitive enhancing substances. “Cognitive
enhancing substances” may be a misleading term, but
referring to the effects of cognitive enhancing substances
as performance maintenance, rather than performance
enhancing, misguidedly minimizes the role that motiva-
tion plays into our self-determined lives.
Kjærsgaard does not provide much support for his
contention that the motivating effects of stimulants2 on
healthy users are better characterized as performance
maintenance. In absence of an argument, first I offer a
description of performance that can inform conclusions
about motivation enhancement. A performance can be
thought of as a task that requires the interaction of multi-
ple processes, activities, and behaviors (as well as desirable
environmental conditions) for its accomplishment; one of
these necessary processes is motivation. Our lives can be
thought of as a series of performances. We complete daily,
mundane activities, such as brushing our teeth or combing
our hair. But our lives are also filled with much more diffi-
cult and complex tasks, such as completing advanced
degrees or training for a marathon.
Both mundane and extraordinary tasks are complex
and add to the value of our lives, but require motivation
for their completion. One can imagine being sick in bed
and not having the motivation to brush one’s teeth, or
really hating running and really loving to eat fatty foods
and not having the motivation to properly train for a mara-
thon. In this example, we may have the cognitive abilities
necessary to perform these tasks, but without the addition
of motivation, our cognitive skills alone are not enough for
the completion of such tasks.
Using stimulants that enhance motivation, albeit not
cognition, can greatly improve the likelihood of success-
fully completing our life’s tasks by giving us the push that
we need to do those things that we want to do and those
things that we know we ought to do, for example, pick an
apple over a candy bar while training for a marathon.
Sometimes we have the intelligence and the skills to com-
plete life’s tasks but not the will.
Referring to stimulants as performance maintenance,
rather than performance enhancement, diminishes the
complexities of the processes needed to complete tasks. It
also diminishes the role that motivation plays in the com-
pletion of tasks and stimulants’ ability to augment motiva-
tion,3 thus enhancing our life’s performances. The effects
of stimulants do not just maintain life’s performances, in
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1. Here I use the term “cognitive enhancing substances” to retain the terminology that is currently used in the debate that Kjærsgaard’s
article is a part of. Any reference to “cognitive enhancing substances” from this point on is for this purpose.
2. From this point forward, I use the term “stimulants” as a way to mitigate the terminology that the cognitive enhancing substances lit-
erature uses and Kjærsgaard’s argument that cognitive enhancing substances is an inappropriate and misleading term. I use the term
“stimulants” because most of the drugs that can enhance motivation, such as Adderall and Ritalin, are considered stimulants.
3. Kjaersgaard admits that stimulants can augment motivation and cites several sources to support this claim.
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the sense that they only sustain activities; stimulants do
more than sustain activities, they enhance life’s performan-
ces by supplementing our cognitive processes with will.
And for some individuals, without the will supplied by
stimulants the performance of some tasks would be impos-
sible even if they possessed superb cognitive skills.
I have argued that stimulants can motivate the perfor-
mance of tasks that healthy individuals might not have com-
pleted without the use of stimulants, making the effects of
stimulants performance enhancing, rather than performance
maintaining. Given the effects of motivation-enhancing sub-
stances on performance, the typical ethical arguments that
are a part of the performance enhancement debate (physical,
cognitive, and mood) are also applicable to motivation
enhancers. These ethical considerations include those listed
by Kjaersgaard: inequality and cheating.
Referring back to the example of running a marathon,
if a marathon runner uses motivation-enhancing substan-
ces to prepare for her race, some may say that she is cheat-
ing. Assuming that there are no rules against the use of
such drugs, the real concern is inequality, that the use of
drugs puts her competitors at a disadvantageous position
for acquiring victory and puts her in an advantageous
position (Bostrom and Roache 2011). Since the completion
of tasks requires a multitude of actions and behaviors, the
runner’s performance is enhanced by her use of motivation
enhancers. It is possible that if it were not for the motiva-
tion provided by her drug use she would have sat on the
couch eating potato chips instead of training, even though
she has the cognitive ability to know that this is not the
best way to train for a marathon. Surely her competitors
who did not have the help of motivation enhancers4 and
who skipped a few training workouts would rather that
she sat out a few training sessions so that they had a better
chance at winning. In this example, without the use of
drugs the marathon runner would not have successfully
completed her performance, leaving us to question the eth-
ical nature of the means by which she used to accomplish
her task. Enhancing motivation via drug use is subject to
the same concerns that are currently a part of the perfor-
mance enhancement debate, even if the drugs do not
directly enhance cognition but are just a part of the perfor-
mance process because they can be used to unfairly secure
victory.
In this commentary I have argued that enhancing moti-
vation enhances performance, even if motivation-enhanc-
ing substances do not directly enhance cognition. This
means that motivation enhancers are performance
enhancers, not just motivation maintenance. I have also
argued that the ethical concerns that are a part of the cogni-
tive enhancement debate are legitimate concerns even if
stimulants do not directly enhance cognition. Performing
tasks requires the interaction of the right behaviors, the
right activities, and the right amount of motivation, mak-
ing motivation just as vital to the completion of tasks as
cognition. Diminishing motivation enhancers’ abilities
diminishes motivation’s role in helping us live the kinds of
lives that we desire.
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4. There are many imaginable reasons why motivation enhancers
may not be available to her competitors that mirror other situa-
tions in which people have to perform desired tasks, such as inac-
cessibility or unaffordability.
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